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Abstract 
We empirically examine the social effect of management systems. We focus on a particular 
management practice employed in self-governed coastal fisheries in Japan—revenue sharing 
arrangement. We hypothesize that management systems affect cooperative relationships and 
information network in a community; broadly termed as social capital. We quantified social 
capital using controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects as well as surveys. Using 
wild cluster bootstrap for small sample inference, we find evidence of the positive effect of 
revenue sharing on information network possibly because revenue sharing arrangement provides 
disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized collective fishing operation. 
Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate unconditionally (i.e., 
unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate conditionally (i.e., only if others 
cooperate).  
 
                                                            





While the primary assumption in economics is that every agent is motivated by self-interest, 
importance of immaterial motivations such as moral, reputation, and values in economic 
decision-making has been recognized for a long time. From Adam Smith to Amartya Sen, the 
vast literature stressing importance of immaterial, unselfish motivations (e.g., so-called ‘warm-
glow’) exists. In fact, many attempts to incorporate immaterial motives in an economic model 
have been made (e.g., Andreoni, 1989; Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Gaspart & Seki, 2003). In what follows, we examine the possibility of nurturing such 
motivations in a form of social capital. In particular, we focus on understanding how social 
capital can be fostered in a commons dilemma, a typical example of market failure when the 
costs and/or the prices do not convey all information. Its understanding is not only important but 
also relevant in policy discussion to help us achieve ultimately better economic outcomes.  
More recent studies on environmental policies highlight the reasons why more attention 
should be paid to immaterial motives when designing a policy. Behavioral response to monetary 
incentives sometimes does not align with regulator’s intention as referred as crowding out 
(Cardenas, Stranlund, & Willis, 2000). In the worst-case scenario, economic incentives induced 
by an institutional setup may undermine individual voluntary motivation to contribute to a better 
world that would have prevailed otherwise (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Carlsson & 
Johansson-Stenman, 2012). In particular, in a social dilemma situation such as a fishery each 
harvester may contribute to the group interest because of moral or reputation among harvesters 
(e.g. Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Brekke, Kverndokk, & Nyborg, 2003; Gaspart & Seki, 2003). 
Trust or reciprocity among members, or social norms can support individual motivation to make 
sincere commitment to a group interest in a closed society. These studies suggest that non-
monetary incentives can play an important role in ensuring success of implementing a policy.  
Non-monetary incentives discussed above comprise many aspects of social capital. Social 
capital is a concept that attributes such as trust, cooperation, and reciprocity among people, and 
norms and networks in a community are important in improving economic life (Fukuyama, 1996; 
Putnam, 2001). A stream of the literature on the commons has highlighted important roles of 
social capital in a community that self-governs a community resource (e.g. Ahn & Ostrom, 2008; 
Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Pretty, 2003).  
Formal economic institutions—markets and property rights—have been recognized as 
fundamental in determining organizational as well as national economic success (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; North, 1973, 2005; Williamson, 1975). As Acemoglu et al. (2005, 
p. 397) state: “differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of different 
patterns of economic growth.” Different economic institutions induce various incentives for 
people to innovate, to invest, to save for the future, and to provide public goods, which results in 
differences in economic success. They not only determine the size of a pie but also how a pie 
should be distributed.  
Needless to say the same argument applies to management of the commons. Institutional 
arrangements inside and outside of the commons influence how successfully resource users can 
manage the resource and thus benefit from their own resource use (Baland & Platteau, 1996; 
Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989). Whether or not access to the resource is restricted to a limited 
number of users can alter the incentives for conservation and thus the resulting economic 
outcomes. Similarly establishment of any types of property rights for resource usage can mitigate 
some of the externality causing rent dissipation in the commons and improve economic 
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efficiency.  
 Another stream of the literature suggests that economic institutions do more than 
changing economic incentives and distributing goods and services; they also affect the 
accumulation of social capital. Bowles (1998, p. 75) argues that they “also influence the 
evolution of values, tastes, and personalities” based on cases drawn from experimental 
economics, history, and other social sciences. Bowles (1998) also points out that moral, ethics, or 
personality matters especially in the cases of incomplete contracting and asymmetric 
information, which are prevalent in the real world including many commons situations.  
The hypothesis that economic institutions affect social capital can provide important 
policy implications, because the level of social capital has been shown to be associated with 
economic performance. In fact, Carpenter and Seki (2011) showed a strong correlation between 
fishermen’s propensity to cooperate (one aspect of social capital) and fishing productivity. Social 
capital is also found to be empirically associated with economic productivity in other workplace 
(e.g. Barr & Serneels, 2009; Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 
2005; Knack & Keefer, 1997). 
In this paper we empirically test the hypothesis that social capital can be fostered by 
formal economic institutions. In other words, differences in the levels of social capital in a 
fishing community can be explained by differences in management systems governing fisheries. 
In so doing we rigorously quantify the effect of management systems on accumulation of social 
capital.  
To test the hypothesis, we focus on a particular management system employed in a 
fishery—revenue sharing arrangement—as our empirical case study. Revenue sharing 
arrangement is a type of management rule in a fishery, in which harvesters share catch and/or 
profits among the members of a fishery cooperative. Employment of such arrangement is a 
collective action that a group of harvesters takes. The economic roles of revenue sharing in 
fishery management have been examined in the literature (e.g. Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & 
Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). To our knowledge this study is the first to investigate the 
consequence of revenue sharing arrangement on social aspect of a community and empirically 
quantify the effects.  
This paper provides the quantitative effect of management systems—whether the group 
has employed revenue sharing or not—on the social aspect of a community (social capital). In 
particular, this paper asks whether a difference in management systems can result in different 
cooperative relationships and different information networks in a community. This paper 
provides the first rigorous analysis to measure the effect of different management systems on 
social capital and provides insights into an effective policy that can be employed for 
development of social capital. 
The data were collected from Japanese fisheries, many of whom operating under revenue 
sharing have been successfully managing the resources as well as generating resource rents 
(Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). For the purpose of this paper, social capital is 
narrowly defined as cooperation and information network, as these are most relevant to fishing 
operation as a community. To quantify cooperation, controlled economic experiments with 
fishermen subjects were conducted. As for information network, indices are constructed from 
survey responses of the same fisherman subjects. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-value method for 
small sample inference was then used to rigorously quantify the effect of revenue sharing.  
Revenue sharing arrangement can be an alternative management practice to solve 
problems in common-pool resource management that cannot be resolved by other emerging 
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management tools such as Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ). While it can mitigate the 
externality in a fishery resulting from the common property nature, the ITQ, which was first 
suggested by Christy (1973), often fails to overcome excessive competition across spaces and 
times, let alone political difficulty in implementation (Boyce, 1992; Copes, 1986). Revenue 
sharing arrangement can be one of a few systems to foster cooperation and information sharing 
in a fishery; it can provide cause for a group and can encourage a cooperative environment for 
fishing rather than competitively fishing only for self-interests.  
 
Japanese surf clam fishing in Hokkaido Prefecture 
 
Any entities that conduct commercial fishing in Japan’s coastal waters must belong to a local 
Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA). These FCAs not only enforce national and prefectural 
regulations but also self-regulate the resources tailored to local conditions. Within an FCA many 
groups of fishers are formed mainly based on the species they target and/or the fishing gear they 
use. Each group has their own rules of regulation and management and can decide whether to 
share revenue.  
Based on the data provided by Uchida and Wilen (2007), many of the revenue-sharing 
groups are concentrated in the northeastern Japan, target sedentary species, and use small-scale 
trawl or gillnets. The coastal fisheries in southern Japan are characterized with fishing many 
species with the same fishing technology, which complicates the process to share revenue. Many 
sedentary species fisheries are required to employ small-scale trawl and gillnets by regulation, 
which results in relatively smaller heterogeneity in fishing skills and outcomes compared to other 
migratory species or other fishing technology such as fishing bonito. According to Fishery 
Census of Japan, the fishing groups that share revenue accounted for 11 percent of all groups in 
Japan in 1988 and the percentage increased to 17 percent until 1998, in which consistent data are 
available.  
We chose the Japanese/Sakhalin surf clam (Pseudocardium sachalinensis) fishery, 
known as Hokkigai in Hokkaido Prefecture, for this study for several reasons. There are a 
sufficient number of groups engaged in this fishery in the same Hokkaido Prefecture. There are 
also sufficient variations in with or without revenue sharing while relatively homogeneous in 
other operational rules.  
Focusing on a particular region and carefully selecting groups based on the data from 
Uchida and Wilen (2007), but without controlling the outcomes, enables us to control many 
observed and possibly unobserved characteristics at the time of sampling. Harvesting technology 
is another factor controlled at the time of sampling. For many years all sampled fishery groups 
employ the jet dredges, by far the most common and the most advanced technology for 
harvesting the surf clams.   
The way the FCAs in Hokkaido organize their shellfish fishery is practically identical. It 
involves (1) stock assessment conducted by the staff members at Fisheries Extension Offices 
located all over Hokkaido in collaboration with the local skippers and FCAs, either prior to or 
after every fishing season; (2) all skippers are called to gather for a pre-season meeting to hear 
the results of the stock assessment from the local Fisheries Extension Office, to decide a Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) for the coming season, and to review operational rules and policy for the 
season; and (3) during the season a leader and sub-leaders closely watch the market prices 
(mostly by directly talking with the middlemen) and decide whether to go fishing on the day and 
if so how much to land subject to the seasonal TAC. Each group usually has an elected leader 
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and multiple sub-leaders for the groups of a significant size. Finally, (4) during and/or after the 
season whether they share revenue or not all skippers in all FCAs are required to contribute to 
the collective efforts to make the fishery favorable for growth of the Japanese surf clams 
although how much to contribute can vary across the FCAs. These efforts include cultivating 
ocean beds, removing predators, and transplanting clams. Many FCAs also buy juvenile clams 
from other fisheries and release them in their waters. 
The sample consists of ten fishery groups, five of which are under revenue sharing and 
the other five are not and have never been under such arrangement. They all engage in a small-
scale trawl fishery, targeting the Japanese surf clams, and are located in Hokkaido prefecture 
(eight of them are in Kushiro/Nemuro region, eastern Hokkaido), which means facing the same 
market, biological conditions, and historical backgrounds. All the groups self-manage the 
resources of the Japanese surf clams as detailed above; they voluntarily set a TAC based on the 
stock assessment; they perform the collective efforts for stock enhancement such as stocking and 
transplanting. All fishers, regardless of management systems, depart from their ports at the 
sunrise (regulation set by the government), but only revenue sharing fishers return to the ports all 
together at the same time. Some revenue sharing fishers designate themselves to specific fishing 
grounds prior to departure and communicate over the radio on the sea about who catch how 
much in where, further adjusting effort allocation on the sea. In other words, the sampled groups 
are only different in a decision to employ revenue sharing arrangement accompanied by 
collective fishing operation in major management/operational rules, but the degree of self-
regulation can differ across the FCAs. 
The fishers under revenue sharing are financially motivated to coordinate allocation of 
fishing efforts in both spatial and temporal dimensions; collective fishing operation financially 
supported by revenue sharing arrangement can further facilitate development of social capital in 
a fishing community. On the other hand, the non-revenue sharing fishers do not have such an 
incentive because their profits solely depend on their own catch and the benefits of effort 
allocation may not accrue to all the fishers equally. The non-revenue sharing fishers do still need 
to interact with each other in fishing operation as a member of the FCA, but the interaction is not 




We collected this unique dataset containing 79 observations from ten fishery groups in Japan. 
The dataset consists of individual social capital parameters, each of which will be regressed on a 
group management indicator—whether sharing revenue or not—and other individual 
demographic variables for controls.   
 Although social capital involves various attributes, the focus in this study is on 
cooperation measured by controlled economic experiments with fishermen subjects and 
information network measured by the survey. Use of experimental method to measure 
traditionally hard-to-measure variables such as social capital has been advocated in previous 
studies (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2005; Carpenter, 2002), and in fact many 
applications exist (e.g., Barr & Serneels, 2009; Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carpenter, 
Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009; Carpenter & Seki, 2011; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 
2005). Glaeser et al. (2000) carefully compared the experimental method with the survey method 
and concluded that experiments could be combined with surveys to supplement to each other.  
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 First we detail construction of cooperation parameters with the experiment and then 
construction of information network indices with the survey. Then, we introduce empirical 
strategy to estimate the outcome variables (social capital parameters) with our variable of interest 
(a group management variable). 
 
Cooperation parameters 
To measure cooperation among fishermen the standard, repeated Voluntary Contribution 
Mechanism (VCM) was conducted (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Carpenter, 2002). Participants were 
recruited through the FCAs, and many of them held some executive positions in the fishery 
groups at the time of recruitment. A flyer was provided with the FCAs to make general calls for 
the experiments and the surveys, and the flyer indicated that the volunteers would be asked to 
participate in economic experiment (play a simple game) in addition to a survey on fishing 
operation and they would be paid in cash fixed participation fees plus the earnings from the 
experiment.  
Before the experiment began participants were randomly divided into groups of four 
persons that were sustained for an entire session. The participants were not told whom they were 
playing with.1 The participants were given 3,000 yen (roughly US$30) worth of coins as an 
endowment every round and asked how much to contribute to a public good from his 
endowment. Once all the participants made their decision the total contribution of each group 
was calculated, doubled by the experimenter, and then distributed equally among the group 
members. The amount not contributed to a public good was kept to the participants. The 
participants earn a sum of the dividends from a public good, regardless of their own contribution 
to a public good, and the money kept to themselves for a round. The dominant strategy in the 
game is to contribute nothing because marginal return from a public good is smaller than the one 
from a private account regardless of total group contribution. The game was repeated ten times 
with the exception of one session.2 At the end of the experiment two of the ten rounds were 
randomly drawn as a binding round and the participants were paid the average of the payoffs 
from the two rounds plus a participation fee of 3,000 yen.3  
 All the sessions took place in a conference room at the FCA or at the community center 
nearby. The participants were seated facing the wall, and in between the participants portable 
blinds were constructed (Figure 1). At the beginning of every round the participants were given 
three boxes in different colors. In a yellow box were 3,000 yen worth of coins—real money—as 
an endowment, a red box was intended for a private account, and a green box was for public 
good contribution. The participants were asked to move all the coins from the yellow box to 
either the red box (to keep) or the green box (to contribute), which made it difficult to guess what 
other participants were doing based on the amount of the noise made from moving coins. Once 
                                                            
1 In case that the number of participants was not multiple of four, which happened at most sessions, the contribution 
amounts of some participants were counted twice in multiple groups to avoid the effect of varying group size as in 
Carpenter and Williams (2010). 
2 The last five rounds were conducted with social disapproval treatment introduced by Carpenter and Seki (2011). 
However, in this study we do not consider the parameters obtained by this treatment although the observations 
during these rounds are used for estimation. The session at one FCA repeated the standard VCM for six times with 
another version of social disapproval for the last two rounds. 
3 A participation fee was set high in this experiment to mitigate concern expressed by many FCA staffs for 
performance-based payment. The experiment accommodated two more games for different research and thus the 
session lasted between 2.5 hours and 3 hours. The voluntary contribution mechanism lasted less than 1.5 hours and 
the average earning from this game was 4,700 yen. 
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all the participants made their decision the experimenters collected all the boxes and calculated 
the total contribution of each group and the dividends from a public good. These results were 
written down on a sheet of paper and distributed to the participants with the three boxes and the 
coins for the next round. 
 A total of 80 fishermen participated in the experiment; two subjects were excluded from 
the analysis. Table 1 shows summary statistics of participants. One to 16 skippers from each 
FCA that ranges from 12 to 100 percent of all member skippers participated in a session (Table 
2). As expected, the smaller the FCAs are the more comprehensive the sampled participants are. 
How representative the sample is uncertain because of unavailability of information on non-
participants in the same FCA. The FCAs greater than ten targeted the skippers who held some 
positions in the group at the time of the experiments in addition to general calls directed towards 
all members because these skippers would feel more obligated to cooperate for research. The 
bottom line is that selection of the participants was done similarly across the FCAs of a lower 
participation rate. 
The mean contribution of all participants is 1,635 yen (55% of endowment) with 
individual contribution ranging from zero to 3,000 yen (0-100% of endowment). Revenue 
sharing fishers on average contributed 1,600 yen (53%) to a public good, compared with the 
average contribution by non-revenue sharing fishers of 1,762 yen (59%). The difference is 
statistically significant at p-value = 0.004 (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). However, this does 
not necessarily imply that revenue sharing-fishers cooperate less because in the sample they are 
statistically significantly younger than non-revenue sharing fishers, which is a very important 
demographic characteristic that can affect how much to contribute (Aswani, Gurney, Mulville, 
Matera, & Gurven, 2013). In fact, significant difference between the two groups disappears after 
controlling for age. For comparison, the same experiment by Carpenter and Seki (2011) with 
fisherman subjects yielded the overall average contribution of 49% (N = 27) with revenue 
sharing fishers contributing 51% and non-revenue sharing fishers contributing 46%. This 
suggests that the fishermen in our study contributed slightly more overall regardless of 
management systems and the difference in contribution between revenue sharing fishers and 
non-revenue sharing fishers went in the opposite direction. 
The observed amount contributed to a public good, y, in round t by subject i in session j is 
censored between zero and 3,000 and is related to a latent variable, y*, as follows. 𝑦!"# = 0            if    𝑦!"#∗ ≤ 0                      𝑦!"#∗           if  0 < 𝑦!"#∗ < 30003000      if    𝑦!"#∗ ≥ 3000 . 
The amount contributed to a public good, y, is regressed on a sum of contribution made by other 
members in the previous round, 𝑿!!" !!! . The model needs to allow individual variation for this 
coefficient for the reason to be apparent later and thus accommodates a random parameter for 𝑿!!" !!! . In addition, it is likely to be correlated within the same subject nested within the same 
session and thus the two random effects for subjects and for sessions are also estimated.  
We estimated this model using Generalized Latent Variable Model (Skrondal & Rabe-
Hesketh, 2004). This model is very flexible that it estimates multi-level random effects as well as 
one random parameter while allowing the Tobit specification simultaneously. The model is 
estimated with the following specification. Γ 𝐸 𝑦!"#|𝑿,𝒖 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑿!!" !!!   +   𝑢!! + 𝑢!"! + 𝑢!"! 𝑿!!" !!! ,  
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where 𝛽𝟎 and 𝛽! are parameters to be estimated, 𝑿!!" !!!  is a vector of a sum of contribution 
made by other members in the previous round, 𝑢!! and 𝑢!"!  are random effects for sessions and 
subjects, 𝑢!"!  is a random parameter, Γ ∙  is a link function (the identity or the probit function), 
and 𝑦!"#∗  is distributed as Gaussian or Bernoulli. We assume  𝐸 𝑦!"#|𝒖 = Γ!! 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑿!!" !!!   +   𝑢!! + 𝑢!"! + 𝑢!"! 𝑿!!" !!! . 
Table 3 shows estimation results of the model. An average participant contributes 1,272 
yen and an individual variation is in a range of 998 yen standard deviation, which is both 
economically and statistically significant. An average participant contributes 0.06 yen (the 
average marginal effect on the observed distribution) more to a public good after observing a 
marginal increase in the contribution by the other members, which is statistically significant but 
not economically significant. This varies across individuals in a 0.08 yen standard deviation at a 
statistically insignificant level.  
The results suggest that the participants care about what the others’ contribution is and do 
respond to it cooperatively. The positive coefficient for 𝛽! implies that they do not shirk and 
cooperate more when the others cooperate more. However, a dominant part of their strategies is 
their own contribution level determined outside of what the others did in the previous round. The 
participants are a group of people who interact daily or at least regularly in a fishery regardless 
of their management systems. It is possible that they decide their contribution based on the 
relationship they have in a daily life rather than on what the other participants did in this 
experiment. This is captured in 𝛽! and its variation across individuals as 𝑢!"! .  
The two parameters for cooperation are created: conditional cooperation and 
unconditional cooperation (Carpenter & Williams, 2010; Carpenter & Seki, 2011). The 
conditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢!"!  and measures how cooperative a person is 
in response to observed cooperativeness of the other members. A greater value of this parameter 
indicates that a person is willing to cooperate more after knowing the others’ cooperation than an 
average subject in the sample. The unconditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢!"!  and 
measures general cooperativeness of a person after taking into account conditional cooperation. 
The greater the value of this parameter, the more cooperative a person is independently from 
what the others are doing. Table 4 shows summary statistics of the two parameters that are 
normally distributed by assumption.  
 
Information network indices 
Participants completed a survey for demographics and answered questions on information 
network among fishermen such as the number of other fishermen they exchange information 
with. The indices for information network are constructed from these survey responses. 
Based on the work by Holland et al. (2010) and Holland et al. (2013), we construct the 
measures of information network a skipper has in the shellfish fishery (Table 5). The size of 
information network is constructed by the survey response to the question asking the number of 
shellfish fishermen with whom to have shared important information that potentially affected 
own profits from shellfish fishing during the fishing season in 2012. An average skipper in these 
fishery groups shared such information with ten skippers. Normalizing the size by the possible 
number of relationships (the size of a fishery group) yields density of information network. An 
average density was about 30 percent, ranging from 0 to 100 percent. This indicates, for 
example, in the case of the fishery group comprised of ten fishermen an average fisherman 
would have shared important information with three other fishermen.  
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After listing five names of fishermen with whom a person has most important 
relationships, participants were asked what kinds of information they shared with each of the 
relationships. Based on the information provided by FCA staff, six kinds of information were 
identified as relevant to the surf clam fishery: market, buyer information, specific hot-spots, 
market for bycatch and its hot-spots, high gear density areas, and boat and gear. Taking the 
average of the number of kinds of information a person shared with the listed relationships 
produces an index for varieties of information exchanged. An average fisher shared about two 
types of information. Among the six kinds the information on specific hot-spots was shared 
most, followed by market information (Figure 2). Information on boat and gear is also important 
in these fisheries as reflected by the rule of many FCAs that more than one skipper are required 
to fish in one boat. These fishermen regard other fishermen as being close friends (49%) and 
having common in boat and gear (33%).  
Frequency of sharing the six types of information listed above during a 2012 season was 
asked for each relationship in a scale of one to seven: 1 as frequent as everyday, 2 as every few 
days, 3 as once per week, 4 as once every two weeks, 5 as once per month, 6 as every two 
months, 7 as once during the season. An average skipper shared the important information with 
other skippers at least once a week during the season. To avoid confusion, the reverse coded 
index will be used for main estimation for frequency. 
 
Empirical estimation 
We are interested in estimating the effect of revenue sharing on each parameter/index for social 
capital defined above. Estimation will provide empirical evidence of how management systems 
affect social aspect of a fishing community. It will also clarify what aspect of a fishing 
community management system can and cannot influence.  
Each parameter of social capital is taken as a dependent variable in a separate OLS 
regression. In all regression models, standard errors are estimated with cluster robust variance 
estimator and then are bootstrapped with the wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron, Gelbach, & 
Miller, 2008). The variable of interest is a binary variable taking 1 if a fisher is under revenue 
sharing and 0 otherwise. Other variables for controls in the model include demographic 
information of fishers: log of age, the number of persons in the household, education levels, and 
log of the number of years in shellfish fishing.  
One may argue that the OLS estimates suffer from selection bias. While revenue sharing 
can affect social capital parameters, social capital could influence the decision for a fisher to 
select into a revenue sharing group. Carpenter and Seki (2011) discussed that the selection bias 
for revenue sharing as an individual decision is not a significant problem in Japanese fisheries 
because each fisher did not self-select into the system. While individual decisions to adopt 
revenue sharing may not possess selection bias observed in selecting into job training, adoption 
of revenue sharing arrangement is possibly nonrandom. Preferences, value, and experience of 
individual fishers have been likely to affect the group decision to adopt revenue sharing. Suenaga 
(2008) emphasized the importance of involving fishers in the decision making process in 
Sandfish fishery in Japan. All the fishers surveyed in the Japanese surf clam fishery who gave 
valid response (64% of the respondents) suggested some involvement in the process for a change 
in operational rules in the fishery. 
One may also argue that the OLS estimates are biased due to endogeneity. There may 
exist another mechanism that can influence the decision to employ revenue sharing while 
correlated with unobservables captured in the error term. One possible scenario is a catastrophic 
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event in a shellfish fishery such as depletion of the resource due to overfishing, disease, weather, 
or all combined. Careful examination of background information suggests that this is not the 
case. First, we asked in the survey whether they have seen the shellfish resources depleted or 
drastically decreased. After dropping 13 individuals who have been in the fishery for less than 10 
years, we found 71 percent of revenue sharing fishers answered “yes” to the question while 72 
percent of non-revenue sharing fishers did, which is not a statistically significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.63). We also examined a numerical measure of 
resource stock density over the last 20 years or so (Figure 3). The mean density of revenue 
sharing groups was 0.59 kilograms per squared meter of fishing grounds and the mean density of 
non-revenue sharing groups was 0.54. We found these distributions between the two groups not 
statistically significantly different (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.61). This can be 
also supported by the fact that all the fishery groups, regardless of management systems, have 
been self-imposing a TAC for the last 20 years at least.  
Causal inference of the estimates crucially depends on how well unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled because occurrence of revenue sharing arrangement is possibly 
nonrandom. The sampled fishery groups have been controlled on some important observables at 
the time of sampling; some relevant characteristics of individual fishers will be controlled in a 
regression. Unobservables consist of a part that is correlated with observables and a part that is 
uncorrelated. The estimates are valid to the degree of how closely related the observables are to 
the unobservables and thus how well these observables capture unobserved heterogeneity.  
Concerns for standard errors still remain. The small sample problem of ten fishery groups 
can understate the standard deviation of the OLS estimators. The literature has been casting 
doubts on inference based on cluster-robust standard errors when they are applied to the data 
containing a few clusters and the invariant variables of interest within a cluster (Angrist & Lavy, 
2009; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004; Donald & Lang, 2007). Asymptotic justification 
of cluster-robust standard errors relies on the assumption that the number of clusters goes to 
infinity. Clearly, the data with ten clusters (groups) do not meet this assumption.  
Although several solutions have been proposed, the wild cluster bootstrap analyzed in 
Cameron et al. (2008) is the most appropriate in this study. The wild cluster bootstrap is different 
from the standard bootstrap method with cluster option commonly implemented by statistical 
software such as Stata or SAS. The wild cluster bootstrap can overcome the problems with 
having a few clusters and invariant variables within a cluster by forming pseudo-samples based 
on the residuals and using “asymptotically pivotal” statistic. A statistic is said to be 
asymptotically pivotal if its asymptotic distribution does not depend on any unknown 
parameters. With a few clusters this feature is crucial. While the standard bootstrap directly 
evaluates the distribution of the OLS estimates, the wild cluster bootstrap forms the Wald 
statistics for every pseudo-sample and evaluates the distribution of these Wald statistics, which is 
asymptotically pivotal.  
The wild cluster bootstrap also solves the issue with invariant variables within a cluster, 
which can be an issue with the standard bootstrap with cluster option. In forming pseudo-
samples the wild cluster bootstrap does this based on residuals not on pairs of a dependent 
variable and explanatory variables, which have a good chance of replicating the same pseudo-
samples if explanatory variables do not vary within a cluster.  
Cameron et al. (2008) recommend to implement the wild cluster bootstrap with the null 
hypothesis imposed. Instead of using two-point distribution originally applied by Cameron et al. 
(2008), Webb (2014) proposes to use six-point distribution, which is recommended especially for 
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the data with a very few clusters, say less than 10 clusters. This can greatly increase the number 
of possible values of the estimated Wald statistics from pseudo-samples. 
Another method, bias-reduced linearization (BRL) originally proposed by Bell and 
McCaffrey (2002) and applied by Angrist and Lavy (2009), can also achieve asymptotic 
refinement. However, it is not suitable with the data in this study as underlying 
heteroskedasticity is likely to be severe due to unbalanced clusters. Monte Carlo simulations in 
Cameron et al. (2008) show that when there is heteroskadsticity, BRL no longer improves 




Overall we find that the implementation of revenue sharing affects formation of some aspects of 
social capital (Table 6). In particular, revenue sharing arrangement has a negative impact on 
conditional cooperation while it has a positive impact on information sharing among fishers.  
 First, we hypothesized that revenue sharing arrangement enhances cooperative 
relationship among fishers; the relationship fishers face in daily fishing operation, which can 
significantly depend on whether fishers are under revenue sharing arrangement, may force the 
fishers to be unconditionally and conditionally cooperate with each other. Interestingly, the 
results show that revenue sharing arrangement does not influence unconditional cooperation 
among fishers but does influence conditional cooperation negatively (Table 6). This implies that 
revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate unconditionally although revenue sharing 
arrangement seems to require greater cooperation among fishers. In addition, the negative sign of 
conditional cooperation among revenue sharing fishers suggests that the fishers under revenue 
sharing are not only uncooperative to the group but also they are less likely to cooperate even 
when they see the others contributing to the group. In addition, the degree of uncooperativeness 
in conditional cooperation (the conditional average difference in conditional cooperation 
between revenue sharing fishers and non-revenue sharing fishers) is significant considering the 
range of the estimated variance of the parameter. However, it should be noted that an overall 
explanatory power of conditional cooperation was found to be trivial from the earlier 
examination.  
 Second, we find evidence of the effect of revenue sharing on information network (Table 
6). Although revenue sharing does not necessarily increase or decrease network density and 
network size, it does increase the varieties of information shared and frequency of sharing such 
information. The fishers under revenue sharing share on average 0.6 more varieties of 
information than non-revenue sharing fishers and they share such information much more 
frequently. The estimated effect of 2.02 in a scale of frequency can be interpreted as an increase 
in frequency from every two weeks (-4) to every two days (-2). An average fisher in the sample 
shares two kinds of information about a fishery with information on specific hot-spots being 
most likely and the market information the second most likely. In addition to these two kinds of 
information an average revenue sharing fisher is more likely to share the information on boat and 
gear while non-revenue sharing fisher on average shares two kinds out of these varieties. This 
may reflect the fact that revenue sharing fishers operate fishing together as a group, which can 
require more detailed information about what other group members are doing being shared 
amongst them. The collective daily fishing operation, contribution to which can be aligned with 
self-interest under revenue sharing arrangement, can motivate fishers to communicate more 
frequently with each other and to share more information. Interestingly, revenue sharing 
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arrangement does not seem to affect the absolute size of information network or the normalized 
size of the network.  
 The wild cluster bootstrap yields the same significance level of the estimates as the 
cluster robust standard error p value. Thus, the inference of significance of the estimates remains 
the same even after correcting for the small sample. These results are consistent with the results 





Economic institutions can influence what social relationships people in a community have 
beyond their realm of economic outcomes. In this paper we examine how different management 
systems in a fishery result in different levels of social capital in a community, focusing on 
revenue sharing arrangement and an individual fishing quota. The results suggest that revenue 
sharing arrangement leads to less conditional cooperation among fishers while no impact is 
found in unconditional cooperation. Revenue sharing arrangement, accompanied by collective 
fishing operation, changes how fishers communicate with other fishers; revenue sharing fishers 
exchange more varieties of fishing information more frequently.  
The negative effect on conditional cooperation is somewhat contrary to the literature on 
the VCM (Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009), which suggested that strong reciprocity 
was a key in team production. The result in this study implies that a key in team production is not 
necessarily conditional cooperation or reciprocity at least in a context of revenue sharing 
arrangement in a fishery. The fishers under revenue sharing, who face the same incentive 
structure as the VCM, are not necessarily conditional cooperators but rather free-riders. Yet, 
these fishery groups have been successfully maintaining the revenue sharing arrangement for 
decades. This can suggest two things. First, the other factor may have been contributing to the 
maintenance of revenue sharing arrangement in these fishery groups. One possible factor is their 
operational rules that the fishery groups under revenue sharing arrangement self-impose. Every 
fishery group under revenue sharing arrangement operates together to ensure equal contribution 
of labor in days and hours among the member fishers. Contrary to anonymity in the VCM, 
contribution in fishing operation can be easily monitored in terms of landings at the port. 
Although the fishers have incentives to free-ride, they may still like to compete in fishing, which 
can counteract free-riding inclinations exhibited in the VCM. Gaspart and Seki (2003) 
emphasized fishers’ nature for competition as an important driver to maintain the revenue 
sharing arrangement. Anecdotal evidence also exists to support this claim; we heard from a 
leader fisherman that his fellow fishers still compete for landings even though they have been 
under revenue sharing for decades. Second, another possibility is that the estimated coefficient of 
revenue sharing arrangement may be suffering from endogeneity. If these revenue sharing 
fishery groups had been particularly struggling with free-riding in collective efforts such as the 
efforts for the stock enhancement, the groups could have been in a way forced to employ revenue 
sharing to motivate these collective efforts. If this is the case, the estimate from the model is 
biased and is not a true effect of revenue sharing on conditional cooperation.  
 The effect of revenue sharing on information network can be attributable to collective 
fishing operation as well as revenue sharing arrangement. In daily fishing operation revenue 
sharing fishers fish together as a group and coordinate their fishing efforts and their stock 
enhancing activities. This way of operation in fishing requires revenue sharing fishers to 
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communicate more information more frequently because information can help fishers to 
successfully cooperate in fishing, on which revenue can greatly hinge and fishers are financially 
bound together by revenue sharing arrangement.  
Insignificant estimated coefficients of the size of information network and the density of 
the network suggest that revenue sharing fishers do not necessarily share information with more 
people compared with non-revenue sharing fishers although they exchange more varieties of 
information more frequently. Revenue sharing arrangement can provide disincentive to hold 
back on sharing sensitive fishing information. For example, sharing information on specific hot-
spots can decrease the return from fishing effort at the presence of congestion externality, and 
thus harvesters may prefer to keep it private. However, it is in their interest for revenue sharing 
fishers to share such information to allocate their collective fishing effort most efficiently.   
This may also suggest that revenue sharing fishers have different structure of 
communication that do not necessarily change the size of the network. For example, hierarchical 
structure or centralized structure is more efficient in conveying information from one edge of a 
person to the other edge; the length of pass and/or diameter of the network can be different when 
the number of relationships an individual have is different. Investigation of difference in network 
structure between different management systems is left for future research. 
Formal economic institutions are important; not only they determine economic 
performance of those who are under them but also they affect social aspects of communities, 
trust, cooperation, other-regarding preferences, norms, and networks. This paper provides 
empirical evidence for this claim. Social impact of economic institutions can be particularly 
important in common-pool resource management because resource users in a community are 
often forced to rely on informal contracting and good governance can greatly depend on social 
capital (Bowles & Gintis, 2002). For stakeholders and policy makers in common-pool resource 
management these results can help to understand the effect of management systems currently in 





Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth. In Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (Ed.), Handbook of 
Economic Growth (pp. 385-472). Elsevier.  
Ahn, T. K., & Ostrom, E. (2008). Social Capital and Collective Action. In D. Castiglione, J. W. 
van Deth, & G. Wolleb (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Capital. New York: Oxford 
University Press, USA. 
Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian 
Equivalence. Journal of Political Economy, 97(6), 1447–1458. 
Angrist, J., & Lavy, V. (2009). The Effects of High Stakes High School Achievement Awards: 
Evidence from a Randomized Trial. The American Economic Review, 99(4), 1384–1414.  
Baland, J.-M., & Platteau, J.-P. (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a 
Role for Rural Communities?. Food & Agriculture Organization. 
Barr, A., & Serneels, P. (2009). Reciprocity in the workplace. Experimental Economics, 12(1), 
99–112.  
Bell, R. M., & McCaffrey, D. F. (2002). Bias Reduction in Standard Errors for Linear 
Regression with Multi-Stage Samples. Survey Methodology, 28(2), 169–181. 
 14 
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. The American Economic 
Review, 96(5), 1652–1678.  
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-
Differences Estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249–275. 
Bouma, J., Bulte, E., & van Soest, D. (2008). Trust and cooperation: Social capital and 
community resource management. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 56(2), 155–166.  
Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other 
Economic Institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), 75–111. 
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Social Capital And Community Governance. The Economic 
Journal, 112(483), 419–436.  
Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012). Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: 
Substitutes or Complements? Journal of Economic Literature, 50(2), 368–425.  
Boyce, J. R. (1992). Individual transferable quotas and production externalities in a fishery. 
Natural Resource Modeling, 6(4), 385–408. 
Brekke, K. A., Kverndokk, S., & Nyborg, K. (2003). An economic model of moral motivation. 
Journal of Public Economics, 87(9–10), 1967–1983.  
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2004). Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental 
Games: A Guide for Social Scientists. In Foundations of human sociality  : economic 
experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies (pp. 55–95). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-Based Improvements for 
Inference with Clustered Errors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 414–427.  
Cardenas, J. C., & Carpenter, J. P. (2005). Experiments and Economic Development: Lessons 
from field labs in the developing world. Middlebury College, Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper. 
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. (2000). Local Environmental Control and Institutional 
Crowding-Out. World Development, 28(10), 1719–1733.  
Carlsson, F., & Johansson-Stenman, O. (2012). Behavioral Economics and Environmental 
Policy. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 4(1), 75–99.  
Carpenter, J., Bowles, S., Gintis, H., & Hwang, S.-H. (2009). Strong reciprocity and team 
production: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2), 
221–232.  
Carpenter, J. P. (2002). Measuring social capital: Adding field experimental methods to the 
analytical toolbox. In J. Isham, T. Kelly, & S. Ramaswamy (Eds.), Social capital and 
economic development: Well-being in developing countries (pp. 119-137). Edward Elgar 
Publishing.  
Carpenter, J. P., & Williams, T. (2010). Moral hazard, peer monitoring, and microcredit: field 
experimental evidence from Paraguay (No. 10-6). Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.  
Carpenter, J., & Seki, E. (2011). DO SOCIAL PREFERENCES INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY? 
FIELD EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM FISHERMEN IN TOYAMA BAY. 
Economic Inquiry, 49(2), 612–630.  
Carter, M. R., & Castillo, M. (2002). The economic impacts of altruism, trust and reciprocity: An 
experimental approach to social capital. Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied 
Economics Staff Papers, 448.  
 15 
Christy, F. (1973). Fisherman quotas  : a tentative suggestion for domestic management. Law of 
the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island. 
Copes, P. (1986). A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries 
Management. Land Economics, 62(3), 278–291.  
Donald, S. G., & Lang, K. (2007). Inference with Difference-in-Differences and Other Panel 
Data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), 221–233. 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868.  
Fukuyama, F. (1996). Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity. Free Press. 
Gaspart, F., & Seki, E. (2003). Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: theory 
and evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51(1), 51–77.  
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. L. (2000). Measuring Trust. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 811–846.  
Gutiérrez, N. L., Hilborn, R., & Defeo, O. (2011). Leadership, social capital and incentives 
promote successful fisheries. Nature, 470(7334), 386–389.  
Holland, D. S., Kitts, A. W., Pinto Da Silva, P., & Wiersma, J. (2013). Social Capital and the 
Success of Harvest Cooperatives in the New England Groundfish Fishery. Marine 
Resource Economics, 28(2), 133–153. 
Holland, D. S., Pinto da Silva, P., & Wiersma, J. (2010, August 2). A survey of social capital and 
attitudes toward management in the New England groundfish fishery. Northeast Fisheries 
Science Center Reference Document 10-12.  
Karlan, D. S. (2005). Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict 
Financial Decisions. The American Economic Review, 95(5), 1688–1699. 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251–1288.  
North, D. C. (1973). The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge 
University Press. 
North, D. C. (2005). Institutions and the Performance of Economies Over Time. In C. Menard & 
M. M. Shirley (Eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics (pp.21-30). Springer.  
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Platteau, J. P., & Seki, E. (2001). Community Arrangements to Overcome Market Failure: 
Pooling Groups in Japanese Fisheries. In M. Aoki & Y. Hayami (Eds.), Communities and 
Markets in Economic Development (pp. 344-403). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pretty, J. (2003). Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources. Science, 
302(5652), 1912–1914.  
Putnam, R. D. (2001). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
Simon and Schuster. 
Skrondal, A., & Rabe-Hesketh, S. (2004). Generalized Latent Variable Modeling: Multilevel, 
Longitudinal, and Structural Equation Models. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC. 
Suenaga, S. (2008). Sandfish resource co-management in Akita Prefecture, Japan. In R. 
Townsend, R. Shotton, & H. Uchida (Eds.), Case studies in fisheries self-governance (pp. 
191-120). Food & Agriculture Organization. 
Uchida, H., & Baba, O. (2008). Fishery management and the pooling arrangement in the 
Sakuraebi Fishery in Japan. In R. Townsend, R. Shotton, & H. Uchida (Eds.), Case 
studies in fisheries self-governance (pp. 175-189). Food & Agriculture Organization. 
 16 
Uchida, H., & Wilen, J. E. (2007). How can Fishery Comanagement Groups Enhance Economic 
Performance? Hints from Japanese Coastal Fisheries Management (2007 Annual 
Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN No. 9983). American 
Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied 
Economics Association).  
Wade, R. (1989). Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Webb, M. D. (2014). Reworking Wild Bootstrap Based Inference for Clustered Errors. Queen’s 
University, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 1315.  
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: a study 




Table 1. Summary Statistics of Participants 
 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
1 if Revenue sharing, 0 otherwise 79 0.58 0.50 0 1 
Age 78 53.24 10.21 26 79 
Education (1: Junior high school 
                          - 6: Graduate degree) 
78 1.73 0.60 1 4 
Household size (persons) 77 2.77 1.72 0 6 
Shellfish fishing experience (years) 73 23.93 13.87 1 55 




Table 2. Participants and FCA Size 
 
FCA Participants FCA Members Percent (%) 
Shiraoi 9 75 12 
Akkeshi 11 73 15 
Kushiro 1 6 17 
Bekkai 8 47 17 
Hamanaka 16 90 18 
Wanchu 7 32 22 
Ochiishi 8 24 33 
Tobu 3 5 60 
Hiroo 9 10 90 





Table 3. Estimating Cooperation Parameters 
 
Dependent variable: Amount contributed by i in session j at round t 𝛽!: Constant 1,272.57*** 
(0.00) 𝛽!: Total group contribution excluding oneself in 
the previous round 
0.08** 
(0.01) 
Variance of 𝑢!! (Random intercept for sessions) 45,915.791 
(0.58) 
Variance of 𝑢!"!  (Random intercept for individuals) 996,737.9** 
(0.05) 




Notes: P-value in parentheses. Multilevel Tobit Regression. 
 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Cooperation Parameters 
 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Conditional cooperation 78 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.08 
Unconditional cooperation 78 0 844 -1,500 2,495 
Note: Eighty subjects participated, two of whom were dropped from the analysis. 
 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Information Network Indices 
 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Network size (persons) 78 10.58 15.03 0 90 
Network density (%) 78 31.08 34.50 0 100 
Varieties of info (1-6 types) 60 2.05 1.27 1 5 
Frequency (1: Everyday -  
   7: Once in season) 
63 2.71 1.93 1 7 
Notes: Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey. The last two rows 
have a particularly lower response rate because these questions are part of the 




Table 6. Estimated Effects of Revenue Sharing on Social Capital  
 













   Control Yes Yes 
Observations 71 71 
F statistics 1.636 9.824*** 
Root MSE 812.3 0.0234 













     1 if revenue sharing, 0 
otherwise 
0.11 203.98 0.60* 2.02*** 
(0.36) (0.19) (0.07) (0.00) 
   
[0.06] [0.00] 
     Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71 71 55 57 
F statistics 2.162 5.184** 19.43*** 6.650*** 
Root MSE 0.333 747.1 1.276 1.696 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-value in square 
















Figure 3. Resource Stock Density over Time 
 
